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This paper investigates whether stock prices react to the corporate
disclosures of pension cost write-off policy, and if they do, whether the
direction and the magnitude of such reaction are associated with the
level of unfunded pension benefit obligation and firm profitability in the
Japanese context. The results of the analysis partially support the
signaling explanation whereby financially affordable firms with large
amount of unfunded obligations are expected to be more likely to adopt
shorter term based write-offs, which are rewarded with favorable price
reactions. 
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INTRODUCTION
In June 1998 the Business Accounting Council of Japan
issued “Statement of Opinions on the Establishment of
Accounting Standards for Retirement Benefits,” for the purpose
of establishing accounting standards for corporate pension plans
etc., in order to swiftly clarify the current status of pension
assets and liabilities, and apply appropriate accounting
treatments to determine the periodical costs of retirement
benefits incurred by companies as well as to make them
compatible with international standards. The effective date of the
standards was the fiscal year commencing on or after April 1,
2000.1)
Japanese companies were newly going to have to record
unfunded pension liability as an allowance on the balance sheet
due to new accounting standards on postretirement cost.
However, concerning the newly generated unfunded amount of
pension benefit obligations due to the change of the standards, a
company may write it off during any period within 15 years.
Moreover, if a company writes off the unfunded cost within a
short period and the amount written off is considered to be heavy
for the size of the company, it could take advantage by recording
the cost as an abnormal loss without deteriorating operating
income figure.
Theoretically, the inter-period allocation of pension costs does
not involve any cash flow effects in calculating periodic
accounting income and hence, has no influence on the value of a
company. Therefore, the value of a company is not expected to
change depending on the number of years over which unfunded
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1) However, depending on the extent to which interested parties define the
actuarial environment for corporate pensions, some companies might have
experienced difficulties in applying the accounting procedures immediately in
the fiscal year commencing on or after April 1, 2000. The Council determined
that it was appropriate for companies that may face difficulty to account for
the items under the Standards for the fiscal year commencing on or after
April 1, 2001, taking into consideration situations where interested parties
involved in the computation of actuarial retirement benefits under pension
plans are not readily prepared for implementation, and to disclose the
retirement benefit obligations, the breakdown of the obligations and other
vital information pursuant to the Standards in the notes to the financial
statements for the fiscal year commencing on or after April 1, 2000.
pension liability is written off, as the length of write-off period
only involves differential inter-period cost allocations.
On the other hand, the choice of a cost allocation scheme per
se may serve as an indicator of potential profitability or future
cash flow prospect of a company and thus, could cause an
influence on the expectation of investors. If the choice behavior is
constrained by the performance of a firm, such that companies
with good performance only can choose a specific method, such
choice could signal good performance of the company under
consideration. In other words, the information on the choice
behavior may have a potential influence on the stock price, even
without changing the fundamental construct underlying the
value of the company in itself. 
Therefore, a company may willingly choose a specific
accounting procedure that seemingly deteriorates the accounting
income in one period and disclose such information with a view
to inducing favorable reactions from market participants. This
behavior is referred to as “signaling” in economics.2) Healy and
Palepu (2001) provides a comprehensive review of empirical
evidences suggesting that a company with a better performance
is more likely to disclose a greater amount of information to
attain commensurate stock price by avoiding “adverse
selection.”3) In our case, the measure of signaling is not the
volume of the information, but the method of allocation itself.
Based on the concept of a signaling effect, we predict that a well
performing company would tend to adopt a short-term write-off
policy to signal its current and future high profitability.
In addition to signaling, Japanese companies reportedly prefer
to report higher operating income numbers because Japanese
investors generally value operating income as the most important
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2) Signaling takes root in a situation of information asymmetry, whereby
inequalities in access to information on quality of goods or services disturb
the normal market mechanism. Spence (1973) proposed that two parties
could get around the problem of asymmetric information by having one party
send a signal that could reveal some piece of relevant information to the
other party. The other party would then interpret the signal and adjust his or
her purchasing behavior accordingly, usually by offering a higher price
relative to when he or she did not receive the signal. 
3) Adverse selection refers to a market process in which irrational outcome
obtains due to information asymmetries between buyers and sellers. The
inferior products or customers (lemons) are more likely to be selected in such
market.
performance indicator. Japanese companies also tend to strongly
avoid loss reports. Consequently, they would prefer to choose
immediate write-off alternatives as far as net income figure does
not turn into negative as a result of accelerated write-off policy,
ceteris paribus. The probability that net income would turn into
negative when a company writes off the unfunded pension cost
immediately may depend on the amount of the cost. Therefore,
the policy choice also would depend on whether the company’s
performance is good enough to offset the amount of write-off
cost.
Our study is motivated in part by the mixed evidences on the
information content of pension disclosures in previous studies
and in part by the paucity of similar studies in the Japanese
context. We investigate whether price reactions to corporate
pension accounting policy disclosures on financial press are
related to the relative magnitude of the unfunded pension benefit
obligation (UPBO hereafter) and firm profitability as a potential
determinant of UPBO write-off policy choices. 
Specifically, this study addresses three research questions.
First, we investigate if the market reacts to the UPBO write-off
policy disclosures on the financial press such as Nikkeikinyu
and Nikkei Newspapers,4) and if it does, we examine if the
market would exhibit differential reactions depending on the
pattern of policies between short vis-?-vis longer-term based
write-off policies. Second, we also delve into the potential
motivators behind varying write-off policy choice behaviors
among Japanese firms. We focus on the relations between
profitability and the length of the write-off periods. We conjecture
that financially affordable firms would tend to adopt short-term
write-off of the UPBO, which signals good news to the market.
Third, we further analyze if the market would react favorably to
the disclosure of short-term write-off policy, even after
controlling for financial performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next
62 Seoul Journal of Business
4) Nikkeikinyu Newspaper is mainly read by institutional investors in Japan. In
the year of 2006, of the 46,300 circulation, 72.9% of the readers were
business entities and 35.5% were securities companies and financial
institutions, which implies potential significant influence in the stock market
despite the relative small circulation. On the contrary, Nikkei Newspaper
features heavy general readership, with 67.1% of the readers representing
general households.
chapter develops testable hypotheses. We then explain data
selection procedure and specify research models. Chapter 3
presents the results of empirical tests accompanied with
discussions. Chapter 4 concludes the paper.
PREDICTION AND HYPOTHESES
A number of studies have investigated whether a firm’s
unfunded pension benefits are interpreted as liabilities. If they
are, stock prices should be lower in the presence of unfunded
benefits since they would lessen the value of residual stockholder
claims. Several studies have reported that this was the case.5) If
unfunded pension benefits are interpreted as liabilities, then
their presence should also affect corporate bond ratings and
bond interest rates. There is evidence that bond ratings are lower
and interest rates are higher in the presence of unfunded
benefits, which is consistent with the market acting as if they are
liabilities (Reiter, 1985).
Beidleman (1973) reported evidence that pension expense was
used to smooth yearly income, and Hagerman and Zmijewski
(1979) found that the choice of amortization periods of unfunded
prior service cost was associated with an income-increasing
strategy for firms with high leverage levels and an income-
decreasing strategy for large sized firms. These findings are
supportive of economic consequences vis-à-vis debt contracting
and political costs. Also, Francis and Reiter (1987) found that
long-term pension expense policy, not just the portion of expense
pertaining to prior service cost, was associated with the
hypothesized income-increasing and income-decreasing
incentives of debt and political costs, respectively.
Unlike these and other earlier studies, our main focus is given
to the stock price movements over fairly narrow windows around
the disclosure of unfunded pension obligation write-off policies.
At least three articulated contexts are subject to empirical
considerations. Firstly, under the newly adopted Japanese
pension accounting standards, individual Japanese firms face
the burden of unfunded pension benefit obligations, which are
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5) See Daley (1984), Dhaliwal (1986), Feldstein and Seligman (1981), Kemp
(1988), Landsman (1986), and Stone (1982) for a review of earlier studies.
mandated to be written off over a period of firms’ own choices
within 15 years. When a firm releases its policy decision in
financial press other than and normally earlier than year end
earnings announcement, stock market would impound the
information to cause price reactions. Providing that the Japanese
stock market behaves efficiently, market adjusted returns over
the short windows surrounding the policy disclosures would be
statistically different from zero. The first hypothesis predicts the
presence of abnormal price reactions around the release of write-
off decisions in the newspaper as follows.
H1: Market responses around the release of the UPBO write-
off policy on the financial press are not equal to zero.
When investors are informed of a specific policy decision of a
firm, they would interpret its implications under the context of
current profitability and possible future wealth redistributions,
and would thus discriminate good news from bad news on the
basis of available information. Hence, market returns during
appropriate windows around the disclosure of write-off policy
would differ for the short-term write-off decisions relative to long
term counterparts. This is because the choice of different policy
type conveys differential signal with respect to current financial
health and/or future wealth redistributions among stakeholders.
The second hypothesis extends the first by incorporating
differential signaling implications between the short and long-
term based write-offs of unfunded obligations as follows.
H2: Market returns around the release of the UPBO write-off
policy would be different between short term and long term
policy adopters. 
The second context to be considered concerns the relationship
between the policy choice behavior and firm characteristics. Firm
characteristics as represented by financial performance and the
relative magnitude of unfunded obligations are expected to serve
as motivating factors for the choice of specific write-off policy. In
general, firms characterized by good performance are better
capable of accommodating early write-off of unfunded
obligations. Also, the firms with smaller unfunded obligations
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would find it easier to write them off over shorter period.
Therefore, early writing-off of the UPBO is likely to be interpreted
as good news and induce favorable economic consequences from
the current and potential stockholders’ point of view. The third
hypothesis predicts that profitable firms are more likely to write
off the UPBO over shorter period. Likewise, firms with smaller
UPBO are more likely to choose shorter write off period as
articulated in the fourth hypothesis.
H3: Other things being equal, firms with higher profitability
are more likely to adopt shorter UPBO write off policies.
H4: Other things being equal, firms with smaller UPBO are
more likely to adopt shorter UPBO write off policies.
We finally examine market responses in conjunction with
specific policy choice behaviors conditional upon firm
characteristics. When investors in the market are informed of a
firm’s choice of a specific write-off policy under the context of
current profitability and potential future wealth redistributions,
they would discriminate good news from bad news based upon
the available information. Market reacts to the disclosure of
UPBO write-off policies partly because individual policy choice
conveys information on the capacity of the company to
accommodate chosen policy. Profitable firms tend to adopt
shorter term based write-offs because they can afford funding for
the pension benefit obligations overdue. As such, the type of
policy adopted by a company could serve as a proxy for the
performance of the firm. Consequently, the information hinted by
the type of write-off policy and that provided by performance
indicators may overlap to a certain extent. If the adoption of a
certain write-off policy in itself conveys incremental information
content over profitability effect, market would exhibit
incremental responses corresponding to the policy disclosures
even after controlling for the firm profitability, which may
suggest the potential cash consequences pursuant to the policy
choice other than current profitability differences. 
H5: Market returns over short windows surrounding UPBO
write off policy are associated with the length of write-off
periods after controlling for firm profitability and the level of
Market Reaction to the Disclosure of Unfunded Pension Benefit Obligation ~65
UPBO.




The sample consists of 372 cases of disclosures of unfunded
pension benefit obligation write-off policies made in Nikkeikinyu
and Nikkei Newspapers by over 400 Japanese companies during
the period from 1999 to 2001. The sample firms are chosen from
the set of companies listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange as of
2006, whose daily stock prices are available from Bloomberg
database. The Bloomberg database was also used to obtain the
information on normal income, net income, earnings per share
and book values per share, etc. as well. Consequently, the
sources of data for empirical analyses are threefold: Nikkeikiny
and Nikkei Newspapers are used to obtain information on the
disclosure date, length of write-off periods chosen by individual
firms and the amount of UPBO.6) The Bloomberg financial
database is used to retrieve accounting based performance
measures at the end of accounting periods. The Bloomberg
market database is used for daily stock prices of individual
sample firms as well as closing daily TOPIX indexes on the dates
within window periods. In order to be included in the sample,
firms had to meet the following additional criteria:
First, firms should experience no merger and/or acquisition,
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6) The data on the specific disclosure dates, the periods of write-off of UPBO,
the amounts of UPBO of sample firms are hand-collected by searching
microfiche database of Nikkeikinyu and Nikkei Newspapers on article by
article basis. The Nikkeikinyu observations outnumber Nikkei counterparts
with the proportion of 342 versus 30. The unbalance in sample composition
may limit the external validity of the conclusions derived from this study. The
disclosure dates precede the balance sheet dates for all sample firms. As of
the event dates, financial data for the same year is not yet known to the
market, which enables the test of signaling effect. Since market responses at
the disclosure dates are measured before the disclosures of financial reports,
the sample structure inherently enables the tests of association between
price changes and future rather than current profitability.
litigation, or other major events that could cause significant
impact on the stock prices over the period under study. There
should have been no stock splits or stock dividends during the 2
weeks surrounding the disclosure date. These criteria are
expected to eliminate the potentially confounding market
reactions caused by unusual events.
Second, banking and service industries were deliberately
excluded from the sample in order to maintain the homogeneity
of the firms under study. These firms are known to have capital
and revenue structures significantly different from those of most
other industries, and their operating performances are also
relatively more sensitive to government policies.
Variable Definitions and Models
This study investigates market reaction to the UPBO write-off
policy disclosures made on the Nikkeikinyu and Nikkei
Newspapers and therefore utilizes event study methodology with
disclosure dates on the press being used as event dates. The
window extends from the 7 days before through 7 days after the
event date, and cumulative market adjusted returns are
measured over varying intervals within the maximum of 14 days
window period centering around the event date. Cumulative
market adjusted returns (CMAR hereafter) over a specific sub-
window period are defined as follows:
CMAR(t1, t2) = (Ri,t – Mi,t)
Where, Ri,t = (Pi,t – Pi,t–1)/Pi,t
Mi,t = (TOPIXi,t – TOPIXi,t–1)/TOPIXi,t–1
Pi,t = closing price of firm i on day t, t = –7 to + 7
OPIXi,t= closing Tokyo Stock Exchange Price Index on
day t, 
t = -7 to + 7 
UPBO write-off policies are captured by a dichotomous
categorical variable POL, whereby immediate write-off policy is
distinguished from long-term based alternatives. The variable
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7) The distribution of the length of write-off periods exhibit a dramatically 
POLi,t = 1, if write-off period of firm i in year t is 1 year
or shorter,
= 0, otherwise. 
The amount of UPBO of a sample firm is deflated by beginning
total asset to control for size differences. The standardized
amount is denoted as SUPBO,
SUPBOi,t = UPBOi,t/TAi,t–1
where UPBOi,t = the amount of unfunded pension benefit
obligation of firm i in year t
TAi,t–1 = total asset of firm i at the beginning of year t
The relationship between corporate financial performance and
the policy choice behavior is one of the major issues to be
investigated in this paper. We use diverse measures of




where NOIi,t/ = normal income of firm i in year t
EBTi,t = earnings before tax of firm i in year t
NIi,t = net income of firm i in year t
The above profitability measures are collectively referred to as
PROFIT for brevity. To reiterate research problems, we first test
the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns around the event
date, which conforms to a typical event study tradition. We next
regress policy variable on SUPBO and PROFIT to determine
motivating factors underlying policy decisions. We finally regress
CMAR measured over varying intervals within the maximum
window period of 14 days around the event date on policy
dummy variable, SUPBO and PROFIT. The last two tests are
conducted using following regression models.
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positive skewness, with more than half of the sample firms opting for 1 year
or less, and most other firms opting for longer than 10 years. As such, the
variable designed to capture the length of write-off policy is transformed into
a categorical variable, to facilitate comparisons among groups with different
write-off periods.
POLi,t = β0 + β1SUPBOi,t + β2PROFITi,t + εi,t (1)
CMAR(t1,t2) = β0 + β1POLi,t + β2SUPBOi,t + β3PROFITi,t + εi,t (2)
Regression model (2) is designed to test the information
content of the policy choice per se, after controlling for
motivating variables. Provided that the choice of a specific write-
off option conveys good or bad news in its own right aside from
signals associated with the level of unfunded obligations and
financial performance, market is expected to exhibit incremental
responses to the policy choice above motivator effects. If the
choice of early write-off policy involves favorable future cash flow
consequences despite lower current earnings figure for example,
the investors will reward with higher than market returns to
such decisions. This scenario would predict positive sign of the
POL coefficient. If the choice of early write-off is likely to involve
unfavorable future consequences on the other hand, the opposite
would be true. As the future wealth redistribution effect of the
policy choice is unclear, we simply test the non-directional null
hypothesis with regard to the slope coefficient of POL variable.
EMPIRICAL TESTS AND RESULTS
Market Responses around Event Date
We first investigate market response to the disclosure of
corporate UPBO write off policy. Abnormal returns as measured
by daily market adjusted returns over the entire window of 14
days from days -6 through + 7 are tested against the null
hypothesis of population mean of zero. Abnormal returns
accumulated over selected sub-period windows are also
calculated. The results of parametric t-tests and nonparametric
Wilcoxon rank sum tests for daily abnormal returns are shown in
Panel A of table 1. The test results of selected cumulative
abnormal returns are presented in Panel B of the same table. 
It is obvious from the table that market responds favorably to
the disclosure of pension related information in the Nikkeikinyu
and Nikkei Newspapers. A noteworthy observation is the positive
abnormal return on the event date, which is significant at 0.05
level for both parametric and nonparametric tests. Although
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parametric t-test also provides statistically significant positive
responses on days -6 and -2, the magnitude of market response
observed on the event date exceeds those of other dates. Non-
parametric test result unfalteringly indicates positive market
responses from days -3 to +2. 
The tests based upon cumulative abnormal returns in panel 
B further corroborate our conclusion of favorable market
responses to the policy disclosure events. Market adjusted return
accumulated over the 14 days from -6 to 7 exhibits statistical
significance at 0.01 level for both t and rank sum test. The
statistical significance increases as window period narrows to 7
days from -3 to +3 or 5 days from -2 to +2, which constitutes
further evidence supporting that positive market responses are
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Table 1. Market Adjusted Returns Surrounding Disclosure Date
Date N Mean t-stat(p-value)
Median Signed rank
(p-value)
Panel A: Daily Abnormal Returns 
-6 294 0.0040 2.2696(0.0240)** 0.0024 2325.0(0.1112)
-5 294 0.0005 0.3394(0.7346) -0.0013 -477.5(0.7441)
-4 293 -0.0011 -0.6916(0.4897) -0.0007 -1226.0(0.3992)
-3 292 0.0023 1.4065(0.1606) 0.0004 1319.0(0.3619)
-2 293 0.0032 2.1224(0.0346)** 0.0016 2289.0(0.1150)
-1 294 0.0017 1.0889(0.2771) 0.0002 739.5(0.6131)
0 294 0.0041 2.4078(0.0167)** 0.0040 3330.5(0.0222)**
+1 294 0.0003 0.1835(0.8545) 0.0023 537.5(0.7132)
+2 294 0.0022 1.5592(0.1200) 0.0016 2246.0(0.1220)
+3 293 -0.0002 -0.1142(0.9092) -0.0027 -1347.0(0.3543)
+4 292 -0.0006 -0.3388(0.7300) 0.0002 -651.5(0.6527)
+5 293 -0.0005 -0.2997(0.7646) -0.0010 -815.5(0.5751)
+6 293 0.0017 1.0973(0.2734) 0.0002 933.5(0.5211)
+7 293 0.0002 0.1196(0.9049) 0.0006 -45.5(0.9751)
Panel B: Selected Cumulative Abnormal Returns
(-6, 7) 290 0.0178 3.4106(0.0007)*** 0.0108 4292.0(0.0025)***
(-3, 3) 291 0.0136 3.8182(0.0002)*** 0.0115 5076.5(0.0004)***
(-2, 2) 293 0.0114 3.5570(0.0004)*** 0.0109 5116.0(0.0004)***
(-1, 1) 294 0.0060 2.4300(0.0157)** 0.0083 3530.0(0.0153)**
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels
respectively.
concentrated over relatively short interval surrounding the event
date. 
Favorable market reaction might imply that market interprets
the disclosure of UPBO write-off policy information on the
newspaper as a positive signaling behavior either because
disclosing firms are relatively better prepared to deal with UPBO
burdens or because the signals conveyed through the disclosures
may contain good news about future prospect of wealth
redistributions among stakeholders.
We subsequently partition the whole sample into short versus
long-term based write-off sub-samples. The rationale is that the
firms opting for immediate write-off could systematically differ
from slow actors, in terms of their capacity to cope with the
unfunded status of pension obligations. Short term based policy
advocates are assumed to represent the group capable of
affording immediate expensing of the UPBO, because the
magnitude of the UPBO is relatively small and/or they are
financially healthier. If market effectively discriminates such
differences in firm characteristics, one might expect differential
reactions to the disclosures by different groups. We expect more
positive market responses in favor of short term write-off firms
relative to long term counterparts. The results of comparative
analyses between the two groups of firms opting to write off
within 1 year and those choosing longer periods are provided in
table 2.
The results shown in the table suggests contrasting market
responses between long term write-off group (POL=0) and their
short term counterpart (POL=1). Abnormal returns around the
disclosure date of short term write-off group are positive and
statistically significant as shown in Panel A. Not only is the price
reaction on the event date significant but those observed on days
-6, -2 and +2 are also significantly positive. The market
responses measured by cumulative abnormal returns shown in
panel B reconfirms positive responses to the policy disclosures.
Notably, the significance of the market reaction during the 5 day
interval from -2 to +2 is the highest among 4 selected intervals
considered, which clearly indicates that the favorable market
responses are concentrated on fairly narrow interval surrounding
the disclosure date. These results strongly support our
prediction that short term write-off of UPBO is interpreted as
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good news among the market participants, contrary to the long
term write-offs. The underlying reason may have to do with
relatively good performance or with favorable cash flow prospects
for potential stockholders. 
In contrast, market reaction to long term write-off disclosure is
hardly significant throughout the 14 days window, except for the
day +6. The directions of price movement are inconsistent as
evidenced by negative signs on day +4. Daily abnormal return on
the event date is positive, but insignificant. Cumulative abnormal
returns measured over alternative intervals with varying lengths
are largely insignificant except for the interval from days -3 to +3,
which is significant at 0.05 level.8)
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Table 2. Differential Market Adjusted Returns Between Short Term
versus Long Term Write-off Groups
Date
POL=1 group POL=0 group
N mean t-stat(p-value) n Mean t-stat(p-value)
Panel A: Daily Abnormal Returns 
-6 151 0.00645 2.4357(0.0160) 122 0.00162 0.60407(0.5469)
-5 151 0.00061 0.2653(0.7912) 122 0.00131 0.50246(0.6163)
-4 150 -0.00046 -0.2181(0.8277) 122 -0.00323 -1.1585(0.2489)
-3 149 0.00201 0.9346(0.3515) 122 0.00316 1.14228(0.2556)
-2 150 0.00446 2.2058(0.0289) 122 0.00297 1.14074(0.2562)
-1 151 0.00145 0.6796(0.4978) 122 0.00344 1.37762(0.1709)
0 151 0.00421 1.9423(0.0540) 122 0.00385 1.26691(0.2076)
+1 151 0.00239 1.1750(0.2418) 122 -0.00234 -0.8855(0.3777)
+2 151 0.00529 2.6786(0.0082) 122 -0.00169 -0.7070(0.4810)
+3 150 -0.00073 -0.3398(0.7345) 122 0.00088 0.3635(0.7169)
+4 149 0.00208 0.9151(0.3616) 122 -0.00489 -1.8629(0.0649)
+5 150 -0.00090 -0.4612(0.6425) 122 -0.00146 -0.4663(0.6418)
+6 151 -0.00070 -0.3815(0.7034) 121 0.00525 1.8599(0.0653)*
+7 151 0.00196 1.0408(0.2996) 121 -0.00265 -0.9030(0.3683)
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
(-6, 7)148 0.02833 3.7672(0.0002) 121 0.00590 0.7116(0.4781)
(-3, 3)148 0.01919 3.6276(0.0004) 122 0.01027 1.9492(0.0536)
(-2, 2)150 0.01771 4.0114(0.0000) 122 0.00624 1.1823(0.2394)
(-1, 1)151 0.00804 2.5758(0.0110) 122 0.00495 1.11951(0.2651)
8) In table 2, significant market reaction is observed on days -2 and 0 for POL=1 
Taken together, above results suggest that the favorable
market reaction to the disclosure of UPBO write-off policy
disclosures reported in Table 1 was largely led by short term
rather than long term write-offs. Market apparently discriminates
different write-off policies, in the sense that early write-off
decisions are rewarded by above average stock returns whereas
long term policy disclosure does not involve noteworthy
responses. This in turn, raises a research question regarding the
underlying cause of discrimination. What makes the market
respond favorably to the short term write-off of UPBO? We
suggest financial performance as one of the key motivators
behind the write off policy decision. Other things being equal,
profitable firms are more likely to opt for short term write-offs as
they can afford immediate expensing of unfunded obligations.
Market might be hinted on the differences in financial health
between different policy choosers through policy disclosures. Or,
if short term write-off is expected to be accompanied by favorable
cash flow consequences from investors’ point of view after having
quickly removed of the unfunded obligations, market prices may
reflect such prospects in advance according to the signals
implied by the length of write-off period. Next section delves into
this question more in detail.
Determinants of Write-Off Policy Choice
We compare firm characteristics of short term versus long term
write-off groups, with a focus placed upon the relative magnitude
of UPBO and various profitability measures.9) Tests are
conducted in two steps. We first employ univariate comparisons
both in parametric t-test and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum
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group, which is not the case with POL=0 counterpart. This result is not
inconsistent with the results of table 1, and suggests that the results of table
1 is largely led by POL=1 group. We also observe a positive reaction on day +2
for POL=1, and a negative reaction for POL=0. We interpret the lack of
significant reaction on day +2 for a combined sample reported in table 1 as
owing to the offsetting reactions between the two groups.
9) The level of UPBO is obtained from the Nikkeikinyu and Nikkei Newspaper
disclosures, whereas the profitability measures are available from annual
financial reports at the end of accounting period. Because the disclosure of
write-off policy precedes the financial reporting, the relationship between
policy type and the profitability might imply advance signaling of near-future
performance by means of early policy disclosures.
test. Firm characteristics to be considered include standardized
UPBO as well as various measures of profitability. Two sample
comparisons are then extended to three group comparisons
employing Kruskal-Wallis test to determine whether the
relationship between the length of write-off period and the levels
of UPBO and/or profitability could be described as linear. The
next step employs multivariate logistic regression analysis, with
the dichotomous policy variable being used as regressand. Table
3 presents the results of univariate two sample tests.
According to the results shown in the table, the differences in
characteristic variables between the short term write-off (POL=1)
and long term write-off (POL=0) groups are statistically
significant with the directions consistent with predictions in all
cases. The standardized level of UPBO is significantly less for
short term group relative to long term group, at 0.01 level.
Therefore, we may conclude that the firms with lower level of
UPBO are more likely to choose early write-off policies. With
regard to the profitability dimension, summary performance
measures all indicate significantly higher profitability for short
term write-off group compared to long term counterpart. For
example, normal income per 1 yen of beginning total asset for
short term group amounts approximately to 0.049 yen on
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(Mean Score) (Mean Score)
SUPBO 156 0.0006 124 0.0008 -2.47 -2.06
(127.30) (157.11) (0.0145) (0.0022)
SNOI 156 0.0491 124 0.0365 2.48 3.02
(153.52) (124.12) (0.0138) (0.0026)
SEBT 156 0.0226 124 0.0056 2.29 2.29
(150.38) (128.07) (0.0227) (0.0221)
SNI 156 0.0125 124 -0.001 2.71 2.74








average, whereas that of long term group amounts to only 0.036,
and the difference is significant both by parametric and
nonparametric criteria. Similar results are observed for earnings
before tax as well as net income.
Taken as a whole, above results suggest that the firms opting
to write-off their unfunded pension obligations immediately are
characterized by smaller unfunded obligations and higher
financial performances, which are in line with expectations. That
is, firms with smaller burden of unfunded obligations are more
willingly disposed to write them off. Also, the firms with better
performances are more likely to expense the unfunded
obligations over shorter interval, as they can afford to absorb the
shocks with less negative impact on their income figures. 
The total sample is further partitioned into three groups
depending on the length of the write-off periods. If the
relationship between SUPBO and the length of write-off is
linearly positive such that larger obligations tend to induce
longer write-off decisions, we would observe monotonically
increasing SUPBO as the write off policy extends over longer
period. Likewise, if the relationship between profitability and the
length of write-off period is linear, we would observe
monotonically decreasing profitability measurements as the
write-off policy involves longer period. Policy variable is thus
trisected by redefining policy variable as follows:
POL1 = 1, if the write-off period is 1 year or shorter,
= 2, if the write-off period is longer than 1 year and
shorter than 10 years,
= 3, if the write-off period extends beyond 10 years.
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SUPBO 156 127.30 59 140.23 65 172.43 14.26(0.0008)
SNOI 156 153.52 59 146.64 65 103.68 17.82(0.0001)
SEBT 156 150.38 59 142.92 65 114.60 9.02(0.0110)





The results of Kruskal-Wallis test are presented in table 4.
The evidence supports overall linearity relationship between
the lengths of write-off periods and SUPBO as well as profitability
measures. As policy period extends over longer period,
standardized UPBO monotonically increases whereas profitability
measures monotonically decrease. The linearity relationship
reinforces our belief that the magnitude of unfunded obligation
and financial performance serve as major motivators for the
policy choice decisions. 
We next estimate logistic regression models whereby
dichotomous policy variable POL is regressed on SUPBO and
alternative profitability measures. Table 5 presents the results
when alternative profitability variables are included as
independent variables alternately along with SUPBO. The signs
of regression coefficients are consistent with predictions and are
statistically significant in most cases. The regression coefficient
of SUPBO is significantly negative indicating that longer write-off
period is associated with larger obligation after controlling for the
effect of profitability. Similarly, significantly positive coefficients
of profitability variables indicate that more profitable firms are
disposed to choose shorter write-off period after controlling for
the differences in the level of UPBO. 
The logistic regression results provide evidences confirming
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Table 5. Results of Logistic Regression Analyses Using Policy as
Dependent Variable
Model: POLi,t = β0 + β1SUPBOi,t + β2PROFITi,t + εi,t
SUPBO SNOI SEBT SNI
β1 χ2 β2 χ2 β2 χ2 β2 χ2
-557.4 4.48** 5.89 3.45* 12.03***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.00)
-573.8 4.81** 3.90 3.28* 11.80***
(0.03) (0.07) (0.00)









predicted relationships under multivariate context. Two alleged
motivators behind policy decisions including the level of
unfunded obligations and profitability are all consistent with the
foregoing discussions in their relationships with the direction of
policy choices even when both constructs are considered
concurrently. The four models reported in table 5 are also
possessed of statistically significant goodness of fit at 0.01 level
in all cases.
Association between Market Returns and Policy Choice
We triangulate the relationships among market response,
write-off policy choice and the motivator variables by including
policy as well as motivators as explanatory variables in the OLS
regression models in which market returns are used as
dependent variables. Such regression models enable the tests for
the relationships between market response and the policy
variable after controlling for motivating variables of SUPBO and
future profitability under multivariate setting. By including the
dichotomous policy variable as a main explanatory variable for
market returns, we expect to test signaling effect of policy choice
per se, after controlling for the effects of SUPBO and PROFIT. We
conjecture if market captures any additional information content
from the policy choice behavior itself aside from information on
the level of UPBO and profitability, consequent market responses
would reflect potential cash flow effects pursuant to specific
write-offs of unfunded obligations. Supposing that shorter term
based write-off policy results in favorable future wealth
redistribution effects from investors’ viewpoint by quickly
mitigating the burdens of unfunded obligations, market returns
would be positively associated with the policy choice after
controlling for UPBO and PROFIT.10) The results of multivariate
OLS regression analyses are provided in table 6.
Regressions are run for various intervals within the overall
estimation window of -6 through +7. Statistical significance of
the relationships between cumulative abnormal returns and
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10) If market interprets lower level of unfunded obligation and higher expected
future profitability as good news, the abnormal returns accumulated around
the disclosure date would be negatively related with the level of UPBO and
positively associated with measures of profitability.
explanatory variables differ depending on the length of the
windows. Presented in the table are the results for the windows
of -6 to +7 and -3 to +3. Albeit not reported in the paper, as
window period narrows further, statistical significance
disappears, suggesting that meaningful relationship between
write-off policy variables and market response obtains only over
fairly wide intervals. The results in the table do not provide a
strong support for the hypothesized relationships between
market returns and policy choices. When market returns are
measured over the entire window, the immediate write-off policy
is accompanied with higher market return relative to longer term
based policy choice after controlling for UPBO at the significance
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Table 6. Results of OLS Regression Analyses Using Market Return
as Dependent Variable
Model: CMAR(t1, t2) = β0 + β1POLi,t + β2SUPBOi,t + β3PROFITi,t + εi,t
CMAR
β1 β2 β3 β3 β3 F-stat Adj. R2
(POL) (SUPBO) (SNOI) (SEBT) (SNI)
(-6,+7) 1.66* -1.92* 0.04 2.62* 0.0178
(0.09) (0.05) (0.97) (0.05)
(-6, +7) 1.70* -1.98* -0.33 2.66* 0.0182
(0.09) (0.05) (0.74) (0.05)
(-6, +7) 1.71* -1.98* -0.35 2.66* 0.0182
(0.08) (0.05) (0.73) (0.05)
(-6, +7) 1.69* -1.96* 2.89** 0.0208
(0.09) (0.05) (0.03)
(-3, +3) 0.67 -2.03** 1.22 2.66** 0.0182
(0.50) (0.04) (0.22) (0.05)
(-3, +3) 0.61 -2.01** 1.88* 3.36** 0.0256
(0.54) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02)
(-3, +3) 0.53 -2.00** 2.02** 3.54** 0.0275
(0.60) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01)
(-3,+3) 0.83 -2.24** 2.15* 0.0127
(0.41) (0.03) (0.09)
Note: First column depicts the intervals over which CMARs are
measured. Numbers in each cell under β1 through β3 columns represent
t-statistics and corresponding probability values shown in brackets. F-
stat column presents F statistics with corresponding probability values. 
***, **, * denote statistical significances at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels
respectively. 
level of 0.1. When measured over -3 to +3 however, the
differential coefficient between the two policy groups is no longer
observed. 
The coefficients of policy dummy and profitability variables are
not significant simultaneously in all cases, which suggest
information overlap between the two variables. These
observations lead to a cautious conclusion that market does not
appear to discriminate between the two policy types aside from
performance features. The results reported in Table 6 suggest
that UPBO write-off policies have limited information content
about firm value incremental to near-future performances. It is
also possible that stock market is efficient enough to recognize
that there is no change in firm value with UPBO write-off
disclosures aside from near-future performance signaling. If
market fully understands the economic substance of what the
UPBO write-off disclosure denotes, it might exhibit no
incremental response to the disclosure of policies. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper investigated three research questions raised in
Japanese stock market context. The first question concerns
whether the seemingly cosmetic write-off policy disclosures cause
significant stock price responses around the disclosure dates.
Market adjusted abnormal returns are significantly positive,
largely led by early write-off policy adopters. The differential
response in favor of immediate write-offs is interpreted as
reflecting signaling effect, in the sense that early write-off policy
choice signals financial affordability and quick removal of
obligations, despite the negative impact on accounting earnings.
We next examine the differences in firm characteristics between
early and long term based write-off policy groups. The early
write-off group was characterized by lower level of unfunded
pension benefit obligations and higher profitability relative to
long term group. This observation corroborates the conjecture
that financially healthier firms are more likely to choose
immediate write-off options. The last test was conducted on the
association between market responses and policy choice types
after controlling for the level of obligation and profitability. The
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results are not strong enough to support the presence of extra
signals possibly associated with potential wealth redistribution
pursuant to the removal of unfunded obligations. Therefore, we
interpret that the favorable market response to the disclosure of
immediate write-off of unfunded pension benefit obligation is
driven by its signaling of near future financial health. 
Our paper is not without its own limitations. First of all, our
conclusion is restricted to the disclosures of write-off policy in
Nikkeikinyu and Nikkei Newspapers, which is largely dominated
by Nikkeikinyu observations.11) The sample composition is
heavily oriented toward Nikkeikinyu population which may
restrict the external validity of the conclusions of this study.
Secondly, the market responses, proxied by cumulative
abnormal returns, reflect information content of UPBO write-off
policies, which may differ with whether a firm writes it off
immediately or not. It may also be the case that stock market
responds only to the disclosure itself, whatever the information
content is. Our research is conducted on discloser sample only,
so that it is probable that the observed stock price changes are
mainly driven by the disclosure itself, not by what is contained in
the disclosure. To the extent that the current empirical design
cannot distinguish the impact of disclosure and that of contents,
the results are subject to joint hypotheses.12) Thirdly, the
empirical model suffers from correlated-omitted variable
problem. Especially regarding the policy choice model, prior
80 Seoul Journal of Business
11) In a related research work based on data obtained exclusively from Nikkei
Newspaper which we do not report here, it was not possible to find
comparable results. The results of replicated tests turned out to be
statistically insignificant in most cases. We conjecture that the discrepancy
between the two results to stem from the difference in the structure of
audience who are the potential investors. Nikkeikinyu readership largely
represents institutional investors, who are more likely to impound and see
through the signals conveyed by the disclosures. Nikkei, on the other hand,
enjoys considerable circulation, a great majority of which stems from general
households. The readers have much less potential to affect stock prices,
because they are not possessed of the expertise to interpret the relevant
signals or are not engaged in stock investments as much as Nikkeikinyu
readers. In this sense, it is hard to generalize our results beyond the
Nikkeikinyu and a careful caution needs to be exercised in interpreting the
results.
12) Firms without any disclosure about UPBO write-off policies need to be
considered in future studies. We thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding
us of this point.
studies report several control variables that are correlated with
stock returns. Market beta, firm size, and market-to-book ratio
are possible candidates. Without them, the reported coefficients
may not capture the economic impact of UPBO write-off policies.
Finally, our study did not elaborate on the potential wealth
6redistribution effects pursuant to the settlement of unfunded
obligations, which may entail further signaling effects. These and
other questions are left for future studies.
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